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THE POSSE COMITATUS

ACT AS AN EXCLUSIONARY

RULE:

Is

THE

CRIMINAL TO GO FREE BECAUSE THE SOLDIER HAS BLUNDERED?

I. INTRODUCTION

-THE

POSSE COMITATUS ACT

Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act' in the political heat
of the Civil War reconstruction period to stop the use of military
troops as a means of law enforcement in the South. 2 The Posse
Comitatus Act makes the willful use "of any part of the Army or
the Air Force" to execute civilian laws a criminal offense.3 The
Act's proscription excludes, however, actions expressly authorized
5
by the Constitution4 or a federal statute.
1. Act ofJune 18, 1878, ch. 263, 20 Stat. 145 (current version at 18 U.S.C. S 1385 (1982)). In its
present form, the Posse Comitatus Act provides as follows:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as
a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
2. See Furman, Restrictions Upon Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse ComitatusAct, 7 MIL. L. REV.
85, 93-95 (1960). For a general discussion of the history of the Posse Comitatus Act, see infra text
accompanying notes 16-42.
3. 18 U.S.C. S 1385(1982).
4. Id. The only exception to the Act expressly authorized by the Constitution is contained in
article IV, S 4. That provision obligates the United States to guarantee each state a republican form
of government, to protect each state from invasion, and to protect any state requesting assistance
from domestic violence. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Beyond express authority, one commentator has
suggested that the PosseComitatus Act would be unconstitutional if applied to restrict the President
from using his implied constitutional authority to use the military to execute the laws in certain
situations. See Furman, supra note 2, at 91-92.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). Express statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act include: 10
U.S.C. SS 331-36 (1982) (use of military to quell civil disorders); 10 U.S.C. S 371-75 (1982)
(limited military cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials); 10 U.S.C. S 801-940 (1982)
(Uniform Code of Military Justice); 16 U.S.C. §§ 23, 78 (1982) (use of military to protect federal
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The term "posse comitatus" means the entire population of a
county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon for
assistance in the performance of his duties. 6 The Posse Comitatus
Act appears to have derived its name from the use of military troops
as a posse comitatus to assist federal marshals in the performance of
their duties under the Judiciary Act of 1789.7
Although the Posse Comitatus Act has been law for more than
a century, 8 the reported decisions do not contain a single case
involving a prosecution for a violation of the Act. 9 The reported
decisions, however, contain cases in which criminal defendants
contend that evidence should be excluded from trial because it was
obtained as a result of a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. 10
This note will discuss the historical perspective of the Posse
Comitatus Act, criteria for determining when the Act has been
violated, and the approaches taken by courts with respect to the use
of the Act as an exclusionary rule.
II. HISTORY OF THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
Early Americans despised standing armies 1' and relied upon a
militia system until 1789 when Congress authorized a small army.12
In 1789 Congress also passed the first legislation authorizing the
use of the posse comitatus. 13 That legislation took the form of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized federal marshals to
"command all necessary assistance in the execution of [their]
dut[ies]."1 4 Although the practice was not expressly authorized by
parks); 18 U.S.C. 5 351 (1982) (use of military to protect members of Congress from crimes against
them); 18 U.S.C. § 831 (1982) (use of military to enforce prohibition against transactions involving
nuclear materials); 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1982) (use of military to protect the President from crimes
against him); 22 U.S.C. §§ 408, 461-62 (1982) (use of military to enforce the neutrality laws); 42
U.S.C. 5 1989 (1982) (use of military to execute warrants relating to certain violations of the civil
rights laws); 43 U.S.C. § 1065 (1982) (use of military to remove unlawful enclosures from public
lands); 50 U.S.C. § 220 (1976) (use of military to enforce the customs laws).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1046 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
7. See Furman, supra note 2, at 87. For a general discussion of the posse comitatus and the
Judiciary Act of 1789, see infra text accompanying notes 13-15.
8. See infra text accompanying note 42.
9. See H. R. REP. No. 71, Part II, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. COnE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1785, 1787. This report states that no one has ever been charged with a violation
of the Posse Comitatus Act. Id.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 373 (4th Cir.) (defendants unsuccessfully
contended that evidence should be excluded because of violation of Posse Comitatus Act), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 983 (1974); Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522, 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (defendant
successfully contended that evidence should be excluded because of violation of Posse Comitatus
Act).
11. See The Declaration of Independence para. 13 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration of
Independence protested that the "King has kept among us, in times of peace standing armies." Id.
12. SeeAct of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95 (repealed 1790); see generally Furman, supra note
2, at 92-93 (discussion of use of army from 1789 to 1879).
13. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (repealed in part 1948). Section 27 of
thejudiciary Act provided generally for the appointment of federal marshals. Id.
14. Id. The full language of this portion of section 27 of the judiciary Act provided as follows:
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the Act, federal marshals regularly summoned military troops as a
posse comitatus.

5

1

The policy of using military troops to execute civil laws gained
momentum and became a critical issue during the Civil War
reconstruction period. 1 6 After the Civil War, Congress passed the
Reconstruction Act of 1867.'7 The Reconstruction Act established
military districts governed by military commanders in the defeated
Southern states.' 8 Although the Southerners conceded the initial
necessity for military occupation, they resented the use of military
troops to execute the laws. 19 Military troops were used to aid
revenue officers in suppressing illegal whiskey production, to aid
local officials in subduing labor disturbances, and to keep guard at
20
polling places.
Although all the Southern states were restored to the Union by
mid-1870, 21 the use of military troops to execute the laws in the
South continued. 22 In 1871 Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan
Act, 23 which authorized the President to use the military and other
means to suppress insurrection and domestic violence. 24 Under the
authority of this Act, President Grant sent troops into South
Carolina to apprehend Klansmen and later suspended the writ of
25
habeas corpus throughout much of that state.
In 1872 Congress passed the General Amnesty Act, 26 which
removed the political disabilities of most of the people excluded
from political office by the fourteenth amendment. 27 Passage of this
"[The federal marshals] shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of
[their] dut[ies], and to appoint as there shall be occasion, one or more deputies .... " Id.
15. Furman, supra note 2, at 87.
16. Meeks, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70
MIL. L. REV. 83, 89(1975).
17. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
18. See id. § 1-3, 14 Stat. at 428.
19. Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics Reconsidered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 703,
705-06 (1976). The Southerners believed that the Northern Republicans were using military troops
to suppress the evolution of politics in the South. Id.
20. Meeks, supra note 16, at 90.
21. A. SCHLESINGER, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 247 (1925).
22. Meeks, supra note 16, at 89.
23. Act ofApr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1982)).
24. See id. § 3, 17 Stat. at 14. Section 3 of the Ku Klux Klan Act generally authorized the
president to employ military troops to suppress any insurrections or domestic violence that deprived
any class of people of their constitutional rights or that obstructed the execution of the laws of the
United States. Id.
25. 5W WILSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 75-76 (1902).
26. Act of May 22, 1872, ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142. The General Amnesty Act provided as follows:
[AII] political disabilities imposed by the third section of the fourteenth article of
amendments of the Constitution of the United States are hereby removed from all
persons whomsoever, except Senators and Representatives of the thirty-sixth and
thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the judicial, military, and naval service of the
United States, heads of departments, and foreign ministers of the United States.
fd.
27. See id.; U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV, § 3. Section 3 of the fourteenth amendment generally
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Act permitted a Democratic recovery in the South, and by 1874
Democrats had control of the House of Representatives. 28 In 1876
Samuel J. Tilden, a Democrat, opposed Rutherford B. Hayes, a
Republican, in the presidential election. 29 After the balloting for
this election, President Grant ordered troops into three Southern
states to guard the legal boards of canvassers.3 0 The election
outcome revealed that Tilden needed one more electoral vote to win
and Hayes needed twenty. 31 Twenty electoral votes were in
dispute, and nineteen of those votes came from the states to which
troops were sent. 32 Congress established a special electoral
commission to settle the controversy. 33 The commission awarded
Hayes all twenty disputed electoral votes and accordingly elected
Hayes president. 34 The Democrats were bitter and partly blamed
35
the use of troops for Tilden's loss.
The outcome of the 1876 presidential election prompted the
proposal and passage of the Posse Comitatus Act. 36 Soon after the
election the Democratic House of Representatives passed the
forerunner of the Posse Comitatus Act as an amendment to an
Army appropriations bill. 37 In essence, the amendment provided

that the funds to be appropriated for the Army were not to be used
for military interference in the South. 38 The Republican Senate
disagreed with the amendment, however, and the congressional
session ended with no funds being appropriated for the Army. 39
During the next session the Democratic House again voted to
amend the Army appropriations bill by including a prohibition
against using the military in a law enforcement role. 40 The Senate
prohibits a person who takes an oath as a public offical to support the Constitution and then engages
in insurrection or rebellion against the United States from holding a state or federal office. Id.
28. Furman, supra note 2, at 94.
29.5 W. WILSON, supra note 25, at 104.
30. 9 E. WILEY & I. RINES, THE UNITED STATES 474 (1913).
31. Id. at 473.
32. Id. at 473-74.
33. 5 W. WILSON, supra note 25, at 110. The Commission consisted of five Democrats and five
Republicans from Congress, two Democrats and two Republicans from the Supreme Court, and an
additional Supreme Courtjustice selected by the other four Supreme Court justices. Id.
34. Id. at 11-12.
35. Meeks, supra note 16, at 91.
36. Furman, supra note 2, at 95.
37. Note, supra note 19, at 708.
38. 5 CONG. REC. 2119 (1877). The proposed amendment recited that no part of the money
appropriated for the Army could be used to support conflicting claims of specified individuals with
regard to positions in the Louisana executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Id. Having recited
these restrictions concerning Louisiana, the proposed amendment continued: "Nor shall the Army
...be used in support . . . of any state government, or officer thereof, . . . until the same shall have
been duly recognized by Congress .... - Id.
39. Meeks, supra note 16, at 91-92.
40. 7 CONG. REC. 3845 (1878). This proposed amendment recited as follows:
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of
the Army of the United States as a posse comitalus or otherwise under the pretext or for
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made changes to the amendment, but after a joint committee
41
conference a version acceptable to both houses was passed.
President Hayes signed the legislation on June 18, 1878, and the
42
Posse Comitatus Act became law.
III. USE OF THE POSSEE COMITATUS ACT AS AN
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A.

CRITERIA

FOR

FINDING

VIOLATIONS

OF

THE

ACT:

A

SYNTHESIS OF THE CASE LAW

Before discussing the exclusion of evidence based upon a
violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, it is necessary to establish
what constitutes a violation of the Act. 43 At first glance, the cases
interpreting the Act appear discordant. A close analysis of the
cases, however, reveals criteria for determining when the Act is
violated. The first cases to be considered are those in which a court
has found a violation of the Act.
1. Wrynn v. United States
The first case in which a violation of the Act was found is
Wrynn v. United States. 44 In Wrynn a sheriff asked the commanding
officers of an Air Force base for assistance in the search for an
the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances
as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by act of Congress; and
no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in
the employment of any troops in violation of this section; and any person violating the
provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction
thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Id.
41. Seeid. at 4239, 4248, 4295-4307, 4358, 4647-48, 4685-86, 4719.
42. See Act ofJune 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
1385 (1982)). The original version of the Posse Comitatus Act provided as follows:
From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of
the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of
executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such
employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of
Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the
expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section and any
person wilfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exeeding ten
thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
Id.
43. See Harker v. State, 663 P.2d 932, 935 (Alaska 1983) (court did not consider whether
evidence should be excluded since Act had not been violated).
44. 200 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
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escaped civilian prisoner. 45 The commanding officers offered the
services of a helicopter and its crew and the sheriff accepted. 46 The
officers at the base instructed the crew to work at the disposal of the
sheriff.4 7 At the site of the search, the crew flew the helicopter in
accordance with hand signals given to them by policemen on the
ground. 48 The crew also took two civilian authorities aboard and
49
maintained radio contact with civilian authorities on the ground.
When the crew landed the helicopter, the whirling rotor blades
50
struck a tree, hurling large splinters of wood into Wrynn's leg.
Wrynn subsequently filed suit against the United States
5
Government to recover for his injuries. '
In federal district court the issue of whether the crew members
were acting as agents of the government was raised. 5 2 The court
held that the crew members violated the Posse Comitatus Act and
thus were not acting within the scope of their employment. 53 The
district court stated that the dissimilarity between the use of the Air
Force in the case to the uses of the military that occasioned the
statute's enactment was irrelevant, since the statute is "absolute in
its command and explicit in its exceptions.
Note that the court in Wrynn found a violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act without articulating the grounds upon which its
decision rested. 55 This absence of articulation appears also to be a
trait of the three other cases in which a violation of the Act has been
found.
",54

2. United States v. Walden
In United States v. Walden56 three marines worked as undercover
investigators at the request of a special investigator of the United
States Treasury Department. 57 The court held that this activity
45. Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 459.
50. Id. at 460-61. Wrynn was a bystander not engaged in the search. Id.at 459. The helicopter's
rotor blades struck the tree after a car passed into the descending helicopter's path of flight. Id. at
460.
51. Id. at 458. Wrynn contended that the pilots were negligent in selecting a risky landing site,
in rejecting a safer landing site, and in mismanaging the helicopter after the car passed under it. Id.
at 461.
52. Id. at 463-65.
53. Id. at 465. The Wrynn court stated that because of the violation of the Posse Comitatus Act,
"there was . . .no activity that could be authorized, no legally cognizable 'scope of employment' to
which the questioned conduct could be related." Id.
54. Id.

55. See id.
56. 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.),cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974).
57. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974). In
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violated the spirit of the Posse Comitatus Act and a Navy
regulation implementing the policy of the Act. 58 The court stated
only that its "interpretation of the ...

letter and spirit of the Posse

Comitatus Act and the Navy regulation... [was] influenced by the
traditional American insistence on exclusion of the military from
civilian law enforcement.' ,59
3. State v. Danko
In State v. Danko60 the court held that the Posse Comitatus Act
was violated when a military policeman assisted a civilian
policeman in the search of the defendant's car. 6' The court did not
articulate the grounds upon which its decision rested, but stated
simply that the conduct of the two policemen constituted a technical
62
violation of the Act.

4. Taylor v. State
Finally, in Taylor v. State63 a military policeman made an
undercover drug purchase from the defendant, pulled a gun during
his arrest, and participated in the search of his house. 64 The court
did not directly discuss whether the Posse Comitatus Act had been
the course of their mission the marines purchased firearms from the defendants who were selling
them in violation of federal firearms statutes. Id. at 373. The defendants were convicted of violating
those statutes and appealed. Id. On appeal the defendants contended that the testimonial evidence
produced by the marines' investigation should have been excluded at trial because the investigation
violated a Navy regulation and the Posse Comitatus Act. Id.
58. Id. at 374. The Navy regulation provided as follows:
"Throughout the United States, it is a fundamental policy to use civilian, rather than
military, officials and personnel to the maximum extent possible in preserving law and
order. In the Federal Government this policy is reflected by the Posse Comitatus Act
(18 U.S.C. S 1385) which prohibits the use of any part of the Army or Air Force to
enforce local, state, or Federal laws except as Congress may authorize. Although not
expressly applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps, that act is regarded as a statement
of Federal policy which is closely followed by the Department of the Navy.'
Id. at 373. (quoting SECNAVINST 5400.12 (Jan. 17, 1969)).
59. Id. at 376. Although the court found a violation of the Navy regulation, it refused to apply
an exclusionary rule. Id. at 376-77. See infra text accompanying notes 176-189.
60. 219 Kan. 490, 548 P.2d 819 (1976).
61. State v. Danko, 219 Kan. 490, 491, 493, 548 P.2d 819, 821-22 (1976). The military
policeman accompanied the civilian policeman on patrol in a city with a military base located
nearby. Id. at 490, 548 P.2d at 820. At the request of the civilian policeman, the military policeman
helped search a suspected get-away car. Id., at 491, 548 P.2d at 820. The military policeman
uncovered a pistol and the civilian policeman arrested the defendants. Id. at 491, 548 P.2d at 820-21.
The defendants argued that the search violated the Posse Comitatus Act and that the violation
required the exclusion of all the evidence obtained as a result of the search. Id. at 491, 548 P.2d at
821.
62. Id. at 493, 548 P.2d at 821-22. Although the court found a violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act, it refused to apply an exclusionary rule. Id. at 497-98, 548 P.2d at 825.
63. 645 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
64. Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522, 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
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violated. Instead, the court focused on the issue of whether a
violation of the Act necessitated the application of an exclusionary
rule. 65 The court held that under the facts of the case, the
application of an exclusionary rule was warranted. 66 Hence, the
court implicitly found that the Act had been violated in the first
instance.
In summary, a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act has been
found in four cases. In none of those cases, however, did the court
articulate the grounds upon which its decision rested. As a result,
the decisions of those courts are of little value in formulating
criteria for determining when the Act is violated. Courts in other
cases have found no violation of the Act, but have articulated
varying rationales. 67 Most of these rationales can be reconciled,
however, to form criteria for determining when the Act is violated.
B.

THE

WOUNDED

KNEE

CASES:

THREE

TESTS

FOR

DETERMINING WHETHER THE MILITARY HAS EXECUTED

THE LAWS

Three tests for determining whether the military has executed
the laws in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act arose out of the
cases addressing the military involvement in law enforcement
activities during the 1973 Wounded Knee uprising. 68 Although
these cases address the use of the Act to challenge burden of proof
requirements, the legal constructions given the Act should be
relevant to the situation in which evidence is sought to be
excluded.

69

1. United States v. Jaramillo
In United States v. Jaramillo7 the defendants attempted to enter
Wounded Knee, South Dakota, when members of the American
65. Id. at 524-25.
66. Id. at 525; see infra text accompanying notes 190-199.
67. Compare, e.g., People v. Burden, 411 Mich. 56, 61, 303 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1981) (per
curiam) (no violation because assistance rendered authorities was civilian rather than military in
, 260 S.E.2d 629, 639 (1979) (no violation because
nature) with State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573,
military involvement was justified by a military purpose).
68. See United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1976) ("regulatory,
proscriptive or compulsory use" test), aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275, 1277
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916,
924 (D.S.D. 1975) ("direct active use" test); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379
(D. Neb. 1974) ("pervasive use" test), appeal dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975).
69. See United States v. Hartley, 486 F. Supp. 1348, 1356-57 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (considered
application of all three tests), aff'd, 678 F.2d 961 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). But cf.
Harker v. State, 663 P.2d 932, 935 n.4 (Alaska 1983) (Wounded Knee cases factually distinguishable
and of little assistance); People v. Blend, 121 Cal. App. 3d 215, 225, 175 Cal. Rptr. 263, 269 (1981)
(Wounded Knee cases factually distinguishable and of little assistance).
70. 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975).
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Indian Movement occupied that village. 71 As a result of their
attempt, the defendants were charged with impeding law
enforcement. 72 In order to find the defendants guilty, one of the
elements the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
was that the law enforcement officers were performing their duties
lawfully. 7 3 In order to disprove this element, the defense attempted
to show that the military involvement at Wound Knee violated the
Posse Comitatus Act and, therefore, rendered the activities of the
law enforcement officers unlawful. 74

The defense introduced evidence at the Jaramillo trial that
during the occupation of Wounded Knee, the Army furnished
weapons and supplies to the United States marshals and FBI agents
conducting operations there. 75 In addition, the Nebraska National
Guard made at least one aerial reconnaissance at the request of the
law enforcement officials. 7 6 Two Army officers and Army
77
maintenance personnel were also present at Wounded Knee. Of

the two Army officers, one's mission was to keep an inventory of
the military weapons and equipment; the other's was to monitor
developments for the purpose of advising the Department of
Defense on the possibility of committing federal troops. 78 This
Army officer also counseled the law enforcement officers on civil
disorder tactics. 79 He suggested the substitution of a shoot-towound policy for a shoot-to-kill policy and urged negotiations with
the occupiers of Wounded Knee. 80 Furthermore, he required the
law enforcement officers to follow his instructions in using armored
personnel carriers. 8 1
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska,
upon reviewing this evidence, concluded that the use of military
82
supplies and equipment did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act.
The court based this conclusion on the existence of a federal act
intended to encourage the sharing of federal equipment and
71. United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1376 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal dismissed, 510
F.2d 808(8th Cir. 1975).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1378.
75. Id. at 1379.
76. Id. at 1380. The National Guard is a part of the Army while in service of the United States.
10 U.S.C. S 3078 (1982). When not in service of the United States, the National Guard serves as a
militia and is not within the scope of the Posse Comitatus Act. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 311-12 (1982); 18
U.S.C. 5 1385 (1982). The court injaramillodid not consider whether the National Guard had been
federalized, but assumed it was part of the Army. 380 F. Supp. at 1380-81.
77.Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1379.
78. Id. at 1379-80.
79. Id. at 1379.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1380.
82. Id. at 1379.
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supplies among the various branches of the government. 83
Additionally, the court noted that the Act could not be read as
precluding the use of military supplies and equipment and that
Congress never mentioned prevention of their use in the
84
congressional debates.
With regard to the use of military personnel, the court stated
that the "critical question" was the degree to which they were
used. 85 According to the court, military personnel are used to
execute the laws in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act when their
86
use pervades the activities of civilian law enforcement officers.
The court found that the Army officer's advice affected the
operations at Wounded Knee and that the maintenance personnels'
services contributed materially to those operations. 87 Hence, the
court concluded that, as a question of fact, there was a reasonable
doubt whether the law enforcement officers performed their duties
lawfully. 8 8 The court emphasized that it did not find a violation of
the Act, but only that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of
proof. 89
Thus, according to Jaramillo, military personnel are used to
execute the laws in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act when their
use pervades the activities of civilian law enforcement officers. 90
This test appears to encompass situations in which military
personnel merely influence civilian law enforcement officers in the
performance of their duties. 9 1 The Jaramillo "pervasive use" test
has been praised for being consistent with the letter of the Act and

83. Id.
84. Id. TheJaramillocourt explained that the congressional debates reveal "that the term 'any
part of the Army or Air Force' refers to any unit of troops, whatever its size or designation." Id. The
court then stated: "It is the use of military personnel, not material, which is proscribed by the [Posse
Comitatus Act]." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. TheJaramillocourt stated as follows:
If there was "use" of"any part of the Army or the Air Force" to "execute the laws"
and if that use pervaded the activities of the United States marshals and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation agents, the marshals and the agents cannot be said to have
been "lawfully engaged" in the "lawful performance" of their official duties.
Id.
87. Id. at 1381. TheJaramillocourt pointed out, however, that "[b]eyond a reasonable doubt the
aerial reconnaissance was of no usefulness to the law enforcement officers." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1379. See also United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368, 377 (D.S.D. 1974) (court
followed theJaramilloruling).
91. SeeJaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1380. In considering the evidence of the military involvement
at Wounded Knee, the court in Jaramillo asked the following question: "[W]as the presence of
military personnel a mere presence which did not influence the Department of Justice personnel in
their decisions?" Id.
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its legislative history. 9 2 It has also been criticized, however, for
93
being too vague to apply.
2. United States v. Red Feather
The facts in United States v. Red Feather94 were essentially the
same as those in Jaramillo. In Red Feather, however, there was a
procedural variation. The government filed a motion in limine
anticipating the defendants' plan to introduce evidence to prove
that the law enforcement officers violated the Posse Comitatus Act
and thus were not performing their duties lawfully. 9 5 The
government's motion in limine raised the issue whether evidence
relating to the military involvement at Wounded Knee would be
relevant to prove that the law enforcement officers were not
performing their duties lawfully. 96
The United States District Court for the District of South
Dakota, like the court in Jaramillo, concluded that the use of
military supplies and equipment did not violate the Posse
Comitatus Act. 97 Accordingly, the court held that evidence relating
to the use of military supplies and equipment was irrelevant and
inadmissible. 98
The Red Feather court then considered what evidence of
involvement by military personnel would be admissible at trial. 99
The court determined that Congress intended "to make unlawful
the direct active participation of federal military troops in law
enforcement activities . . . [and] did not intend to make unlawful
the involvement of federal troops in a passive role. .. ."100 Hence,
the court concluded that evidence relating to the direct active use of

military personnel was relevant and admissible while evidence
92. See Meeks, supra note 16, at 122-23. The author explained that Jaramillo and Banks
"accurately reflect the legislative intent behind the Posse Comitatus Act" since the Act "prohibits all
execution of civil law except where specifically authorized by Congress or the Constitution." Id. at
122. The author also stated that "the history of the Act [does not] support the argument that only
active aid is prohibited." Id. at 122-23.
93. See United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1976), aff'dsub. nom. United
States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977).Judge Van Sickle of
the Federal District Court for the District of North Dakota stated that his concern with the
"pervasive use" test was that it "requires ajudgment to be made from too vague a standard." Id.
94. 392 F. Supp. 916, 918-20 (D.S.D. 1975).
95. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 920 (D.S.D. 1975).
96. Id.
97. Id.at 923.
98. Id. at 924. The court in Red Feather stated that this holding was supported by common sense
because many small governmental units do not have inventories of supplies and equipment adequate
to meet natural disasters and civil disorders. Id. The court explained that it would do violence to the
intent of Congress in passing the Posse Comitatus Act to hold that those arrested for criminal acts
during a civil disorder should be "released because law enforcement officers were using military
equipment to aid in executing the law." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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relating to the passive use of military personnel was irrelevant and
inadmissible.10 1 In order to demonstrate what constitutes an active
role of direct law enforcement, the court listed several activities as
examples: "arrest; seizure of evidence; search of a person; search of
a building; investigation of a crime; interviewing witnesses; pursuit
of an escaped civilian prisoner; [and] search of an area for a suspect
....

'102

In contrast, the court listed examples of passive activities

that would only indirectly aid law enforcement. 10 3 These activities
include the activities performed by the military personnel at

Wounded Knee, such as giving tactical advice to civilian law
enforcement officers and maintaining military equipment.

104

The court's holding in Red Feather that the Posse Comitatus
Act is violated only when there is a direct active use of military
personnel to execute the laws has received inconsistent reviews.
One commentator has criticized the Red Feather "direct active use"
test as not being supported by either the letter of the Act or its
legislative history. 10 5 Another commentator, however, has praised
the test for being just the opposite - consistent with the Act's letter
10 6
and spirit as well as its legislative history.
3. United States v. McArthur
In United States v. McArthur'0 7 the United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota reconsidered the posse comitatus
issue presented in Red Feather.108 The court in McArthur found that
101. Id. at 925.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court in Red Feather listed the following activities as examples of passive activities
that would only indirectly aid law enforcement:
[M]ere presence of military personnel under orders to report on the necessity for
military intervention; preparation of contingency plans to be used if military
intervention is ordered; advice or recommendations given to civilian law enforcement
officers by military personnel on tactics or logistics; presence of military personnel to
deliver military materiel, equipment or supplies, to train local law enforcement
officials on the proper use and care of such materiel or equipment, and to maintain
such materiel or equipment; aerial photographic reconnaissance flights and other like
activities.
Id.

104. Id.
105. See Meeks, supra note 16, at 122-23.
106. See Note, supra note 19, at 730. The author states that the congressional debates over the
Posse Comitatus Act reveal a desire to "develop local capabilities to handle local problems." Id. The
'direct active use" test, the author reasons, would allow the military to assist small governmental
units in a passive role without violating the Act. Id. The author points out that this passive assistance
may help governmental units handle their own problems without the need for the commitment of
military troops pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority. Id.
107. 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1976), aff'd sub. nor. United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275
(8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977).
108. United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 189 n. I (D.N.D.), aff'dsub. nora. United
States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977). McArthur was one of
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the evidence of military activity was admissible as going to the
prosecution's proof on the element of the crime requiring the law
enforcement officers to have been performing their duties
lawfully.' 0 9 In deciding whether the evidence of military activity
created a reasonable doubt on this element, the court developed yet
another test for determining what constitutes an execution of the
laws in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act." 0
The test the McArthur court applied was whether the civilian
law enforcement officers used the military personnel in a manner
that "subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power which
was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, either
presently or prospectively." 1 1 1 In applying its test the court noted
that both Jaramillo and Red Feather concluded that use of military
supplies and equipment did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act.' 1 2
The court then reasoned that the policy of sharing federal
equipment and supplies among branches of the government
extended to expert advisors. 113 The Army officer's tactical advice,
the court stated, "was borrowed as a vehicle might be
borrowed. 1 4+ The court also noted that the presence of Army
officers at Wounded Knee for the purpose of preparing for possible
military action pursuant to a Presidential order was inconsistent
with a violation of the Act." 5 This preparation could not be
"equated to the actual use by civilian authorities of a part of the
Army or Air Force to execute the laws.""1t 6 Hence, the court
concluded that the evidence of military activity did not taint a
"presumption that [the] law enforcement officers were acting in
performance of their duties.""I
Thus, the McArthur court held that military personnel are used
to execute the laws in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act when
several cases transfered from the District of South Dakota to the District of North Dakota pursuant to
Rule 21(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 189 & nI.1.
Rule 21(b) specifies as
follows: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the court upon
motion of the defendant may transfer the proceeding as to him or any one or more of the counts
thereof to another district." FED. R. CRIM. P. 21.
109. 419 F. Supp. at 194.
110. Id. The McArthur court refused to adopt either theearamillo "pervasive use" test or the Red
Feather "direct active use" test. Id. The McArthur court criticized theJaramillo "pervasive use" test
for being too vague to apply, see supra note 93, and criticized the Red Feather "direct active use" test
for being too mechanical. 419 F. Supp. at 194.
111. 419 F. Supp. at 194. The McArthur court stated that "the feared use which is prohibited by
the posse comitatus statute is that which is regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory in nature, and
causes the citizens to be presently or prospectively subject to regulations, proscriptions, or
compulsions imposed by military authority." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 195.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

61:10 7

their use is regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.1 1 8 In
developing this test the court in McArthur criticized the "direct
active use" test developed in Red Feather for being too
mechanical. 11 9 It appears, however, that the only difference
between the "direct active use" test and the "regulatory,
proscriptive or compulsory use" test is the words describing them.
In both cases the courts concluded that the passive role played by
the military personnel at Wounded Knee did not constitute an
execution of the laws in violation of the Act. 12 0 Furthermore, to the
extent the words "direct active" and "regulatory, proscriptive or
compulsory" have different meanings, the difference seems
inconsequential. Both tests appear to encompass situations in
which military personnel perform traditional duties of law
enforcement officers, such as making an arrest or searching for
12
evidence. 1
In summary, the Wounded Knee cases developed three tests
for determining what constitutes an execution of the laws in
violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Only one, however, appears
to be significantly different from the other two. The "pervasive
use" test developed in Jaramillo encompasses situations in which
military personnel merely influence civilian law enforcement
officers in the performance of their duties.122 The "direct active
use" test developed in Red Feather and the "regulatory, proscriptive
or compulsory use" test developed in McArthur, however, do not
encompass this type of passive activity. 123 Instead, these tests
appear to apply to situations in which military personnel perform
traditional duties of law enforcement officers, such as making an
24
arrest or searching for evidence. 1
Arguably, the Red Feather and McArthur tests are the proper
118. Id.at 194.
119. Id. See supra note 110.
120. See McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194-95 (military involvement did not satisfy "regulatory,
proscriptive or compulsory use" test); Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 925 (passive involvement of
military troops not unlawful under Posse Comitatus Act).
121. See McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194 (" 'execute' implies an authoritarian act"); Red Feather,
392 F. Supp. at 925 (execution of laws encompasses activities such as making an arrest or searching
for evidence).
122. See supra note 91.
123. See supra note 120.
124. See supra note 121. These tests appear to parallel a congressional limitation placed on the
use of military personnel pursuant to the provisions of 10 U.S.C. §§ 373-74 (1982), which authorize
limited military cooperation with civilian law enforcement officers. Id. This limitation requires the
Defense Department to issue regulations necessary to prevent military personnel from participating
directly "in an interdiction of a vessel or aircraft, a search and seizure, arrest, or other similar
activity .... - 18 U.S.C. S 375 (1982). They also appear to parallel an explicit exception to the Posse
Comitatus Act in 18 U.S.C. 5 831 (1982), which prohibits certain transactions involving nuclear
materials. Id. This exception provides that notwithstanding the Posse Comitatus Act, military
personnel may in certain cases "arrest persons and conduct searches and seizures with respect to
violations of[section 831]." Id.
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constructions of the words "execute the laws.' 125 These tests allow
the military to provide passive aid to civilian authorities without
violating the Act.' 26 This passive aid may in many cases satisfy the
1 27
needs of civilian authorities during periods of civil disorder.
Hence, there may be no need to have military troops called out
pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority. 12 8 This result is
desirable because once military troops are called out pursuant to
constitutional or statutory authority the Posse Comitatus Act does
not apply and the troops may engage in law enforcement activities
without restriction. 129 In contrast, under the "pervasive use" test
developed in Jaramillo, military troops would have to be called out
pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority only; any other
commitment would violate the Act. 130 This immediate commitment
of troops may be undesirable, and under the Red Feather and
13
McArthur tests it would be unnecessary in many cases. 1
C.

NATURE OF THE ASSISTANCE: MILITARY OR CIVILIAN?

Some cases hold that the Posse Comitatus Act is not violated
when military personnel assist civilian law enforcement officers on
their own initiative as private citizens. 132 The Michigan Supreme
Court's opinion in People v. Burden13.3 illustrates the rationale of
these cases.
In Burden a member of the United States Air Force
participated as an undercover agent in a drug investigation. 134 As a
result of this investigation, the state police arrested the
defendants. 135 The Air Force base commander approved of the
airman's participation in the investigation, and in return for his
participation, the civilian authorities dropped criminal charges
against him. 136 The defendants filed a motion to exclude the
airman's testimony at trial, alleging that the airman's participation
125. 18 U.S.C. 1385 (1982).
126.Seesupra note 120.
127. Cf supra note 106.

128. Id.
129. See Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 924.

130. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
131. Cf Note, supra note 19, at 730.
132. See People v. Blend, 121 Cal. App. 3d 215, 227, 175 Cal. Rptr. 263, 270 (1981) (Wave's
participation in investigation leading to arrest of defendant characterized as civilian); People v.
Burden, 411 Mich. 56, 61, 303 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1981) (per curiam) (airman's participation in
investigation leading to arrest of defendant characterized as civilian); cf Burns v. State, 473 S.W.2d
19, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (in concluding that Act was not violated, court relied in part on
undercover agent's civilian status).
133. 411 Mich. 56, 58, 303 N.W.2d 444, 445 (1981) (per curiam).

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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in the investigation violated the Posse Comitatus Act. 1 37 The trial
court ordered the exclusion of the testimony and the intermediate
appellate court affirmed.

38

1

Finding no violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, the Michigan
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. 139 The court stated that
"[o]ne must look to the nature of the assistance rendered the
civilian authority in each case to determine if the aid may be
characterized as military.' 140 In determining that the airman's
participation was civilian in character, the court noted that the
airman was not in military uniform, not acting under military
orders, and not a regular military law enforcement agent. 14 1 The
court also noted that the airman's military status did not enhance
42
his usefulness to the civilian authorities. 1
The court's holding in Burden that the Posse Comitatus Act is
not violated when the assistance rendered by military personnel
may be characterized as civilian rather than military appears to be
consistent with the Act's language. Activity that is civilian in
nature does not satisfy the Act's requirement that the activity be
performed by "any part of the Army or Air Force." 1 43 In reaching
the conclusion that the airman's assistance was civilian in nature,
the court did not need to address whether there was an execution of
the laws under the Act. 144 Moreover, the court did not need to
address whether the military had its own purpose in the law
enforcement activities performed, an issue considered in another
line of cases interpreting the Act.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 61, 303 N.W.2d at 447.
140. Id. In reaching the conclusion that violations of the Posse Comitatus Act depend on the
nature of the assistance rendered civilian authorities, the court relied on the debates in Congress over
passage of the Act. Id. at 59-60; 303 N.W.2d at 446. One of the court's quotations from these debates
is as follows:
"If a soldier sees a man assaulting me with a view to take my life, he is not going
to stand by and see him do it; he comes to my relief not as a soldier, but as a human
being, a man with a soul in his body, and as a citizen."
Id. at 60, 303 N.W.2d at 446 (quoting 7 CONG. REC. 4245 (1878) (remarks of Senator Merrimon)).
141. Id. at61, 303 N.W.2d at 447.
142. Id. One commentator has listed factors which may characterize activity as being military in
nature:
Some factors ... include aid given during duty hours, aid prompted or suggested by a
military superior or aid given with the knowledge or acquiescence of a military
superior. Other considerations include the manner in which the civil authorities
contacted the military person, whether that person regularly performs military law
enforcement functions, and whether or not the individual's usefulness to civil
authorities is related to his military status.
Meeks, supra note 16, at 127.
143. 18 U.S.C S 1385 (1982).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 70-131.
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THE MILITARY PURPOSE DOCTRINE

Several cases hold that the Posse Comitatus Act is not violated
when a military purpose justifies military involvement in civilian
law enforcement. 145 The North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion
in State v. Nelson 146 exemplifies this line of cases.
In Nelson civilian authorities arrested two soldiers. 14 7 After
their arrest, military authorities entered the soldiers' billets
pursuant to military regulations requiring that an inventory be
taken of a soldier's equipment whenever he has been gone for a
certain length of time. 148 Thereafter, the authorities noticed
newspaper accounts that described certain stolen items. 149 The
descriptions appeared to match some of the items seized from the
soldiers' billets. 150 The military authorities turned the items over to
civilian authorities who used them in their prosecution of the
soldiers.' 5 1 The soldiers were convicted of several charges and
52
appealed.'
On appeal the soldiers contended that the items seized from
their billets should have been excluded from evidence because they
were given to the civilian authorities in violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act. 153 Stating that the Act is not violated when the
military performs acts primarily for military purposes and only
incidentally enhances civilian law enforcement, the North Carolina
Supreme Court found no violation of the Act.' 54 The court
reasoned that the military inventory that led to the surrender of the
items was initially conducted for military purposes and only
law
of civilian
the effectiveness
incidentally enhanced
55
enforcement. 1'
145. See, e.g., Harker v. State, 663 P.2d 932, 937 (Alaska 1983) (Posse Comitatus Act not
violated because military policeman who arrested civilian had a military duty to make the arrest in
-, 260 S.E.2d 629, 639 (1979)
order to protect persons on base); State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573,
(Posse Comitatus Act not violated since military inventory that led to the surrender of evidence
against the defendants was conducted pursuant to military regulations), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929
(1980); cf. United States v. Hartly, 486 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (in concluding that
Act was not violated, court relied in part on fact that military personnel involved were performing
their normal military duties), aff'd, 678 F.2d 961 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 815, 834 (1983). The
military purpose doctrine evolved from the following quotation in a law review article: "[It] is the
author's conclusion that . . . those situations where an act performed primarily for the purpose of
insuring the accomplishment of the mission of the armed forces incidentally enhances the
enforcement of civilian law do not violate the statute." Furman, supra note 2, at 128.
146. 298 N.C. 573, 260 S.E.2d 629 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
260 S.E.2d 629, 634 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929
147. State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573, __,
(1980).
148. Id. at __, 260 S.E.2d at 635.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at__ , 260 S.E.2d at 635-36.
152. Id. at__ , 260 S.E.2d at 634.
153. Id. at -. , 260 S.E.2d at 639.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Thus, according to Nelson, the Posse Comitatus Act is not
violated when a military purpose justifies military involvement in
civilian law enforcement. 15 6 In Nelson the military involvement
justified by a military purpose was activity conducted pursuant to
military regulations. 157 Types of military involvement justified by a
military purpose in other cases include (1) activities focusing on the
illicit drug dealings of an Army officer;1 5 8 (2) the performance of
military duties relating to the removal of military personnel from
situations potentially involving the breach of civilian laws; 159 and
(3) the protection of persons on base from "fleeing armed
felons. ''160
Note that by reaching the conclusion that the military
involvement in Nelson was justified by a military purpose, the court
did not need to address whether there was an execution of the
laws.1 6 1 Further, the court did not need to address whether the
62
involvement was civilian or military in nature. 1
E. A

POSSIBLE APPROACH

POSSE

COMITATUS

ACT

FOR DETERMINING

WHETHER THE

IS VIOLATED

An analysis of the cases interpreting the Posse Comitatus Act
reveals that although the cases appear inconsistent, most can be
reconciled. This analysis results in the following criteria for
determining when the Act is violated:
156. Id.at-,
260 S.E.2d at 639.
157. Seeid. at-_., 260 S.E.2d at 639.
158. See State v. Trueblood, 46 N.C. App. 541,
-, 265 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1980). In Trueblooda
military investigator accompanied a civilian law enforcement official during an investigation of the
defendant, an Army officer. Id. at -,
265 S.E.2d at 663. The civilian law enforcement official
arrested the defendant after he sold drugs to a civilian undercover agent. Id. at __,
265 S.E.2d at
664. The defendant contended that the military investigator's participation in the investigation
violated the Posse Comitatus Act and that all the evidence obtained as a result of the violation should
have been excluded at his trial. Id. at __
, 265 S.E.2d at 663. The court found no violation of the
Act, reasoning that the defendant Army officer's drug dealings were of direct concern to the military
investigator in the performance of his duties. Id. at __
, 265 S.E.2d at 664.
159. See State v. Sanders, 303 N.C. 657,
, 281 S.E.2d 7, 10, cerl.
denied, 454 U.S. 973
(1981). In Sanders two military policeman assisted a civilian policeman in making an unlawful arrest
of the defendant soldier. Id. at __
, 281 S.E.2d at 8. Thereafter, the defendant killed a third
.military policeman who was attempting to take him back to base. Id. at __, 281 S.E.2d at 9. The
defendant admitted the killing in a written statement, but later argued that suppression of the
statement was required because it had been obtained as a result of a violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act. Id. at , 281 S.E.2d at 9-10. Reasoning that the military policemen were performing their
military duties in attempting to remove the defendant soldier from a situation potentially involving
the breach of civilian laws, the court held there was no violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Id. at
__

281 S.E.2d at 10.

160. See Harker v. State, 663 P.2d 932, 937 (Alaksa 1983). In Harker a military policeman
stopped a suspected get-away car on a military base, arrested the defendant, and searched and seized
evidence from the car. Id. at 933. The defendant argued that the military policeman's activity
violated the Posse Comitatus Act and that the evidence taken as a result of the violation should have
been excluded at his trial. Id. Reasoning in part that the military policeman had a military duty to
protect persons on base from "fleeing armed felons," the court concluded that the Posse Comitatus
Act was not violated. Id. at 937.
161. Seesupra text accompanying notes 70-131.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 132-144.
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First, the activity must be performed "willfully." 163 Although
the Act specifically imposes this requirement, courts have virtually
ignored it. 164
1 65
Second, the activity must be an execution of the laws.
Arguably, the "direct active use" test developed in Red Feather and
the "regulatory proscriptive or compulsory use" test developed in
McArthur are the proper constructions of the words "execute the
laws.' 1 6 6 These tests appear to encompass situations in which
military personnel perform traditional duties of law enforcement
officers rather than situations in which they provide only passive
67
assistance to civilian authorities. 1
Third, the activity must be performed by "any part of the
Army or Air Force.' 16 Apparently this requirement means that
military personnel must perform the activity and that they must not
be acting on their own initiative as private citizens. 169 The use of
military supplies and equipment does not appear to fall under this
70

requirement. 1

Finally, the activity must not fall under the military purpose%
doctrine. 171 Under this doctrine acts performed primarily for
military purposes that only incidentally enhance civilian law
72
enforcement do not violate the Posse Comitatus Act. 1
Admittedly, the preceding criteria do not set forth a clear-cut
test for determining whether activity violates the Posse Comitatus
Act. All of the criteria await further development by the courts on a
case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, these criteria represent a synthesis
163. 18 U.S.C. S 1385 (1982). The word "willfully" in a criminal statute usually means "an act
done with a bad purpose . . ., without justifiable excuse .. . ; [or] stubbornly, obstinately, [and]
perversely ....
The word is also employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing
it is lawful . . . or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act
.
United
.
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933).
164. But see Harker v. State, 663 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1983). In Harker the court construed
"willfully" as requiring that civilian authorities request military assistance and as not encompassing
situations in which the military volunteers assistance. Id. at 937. Arguably, this construction is
wrong. The word "willfully" appears to implement a culpability requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385
(1982).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 70-131.
166. 18 U.S.C. S 1385 (1982); seesupra text accompanying notes 125-131.
167. Seesupra note 121 and accompanying text. Compare, e.g., United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d
372, 373, 376 (4th Cir.) (military personnel acted as undercover agents investigating crime, thus
violating Navy regulation substantially similar to Posse Comitatus Act), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983
(1974) andState v. Danko, 219 Kan. 490, 491, 493, 548 P.2d 819, 820, 822 (1976) (trial court found
violation of Act when military personnel participated in search of car) with Burns v. State, 473
S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (no violation of Act because execution of laws did not occur
when military police accompanied civilian authorities to place of arrest).
168. 18 U.S.C. S 1835; see supra text accompanying notes 132-144.
169. See, e.g., People v. Burden, 411 Mich. 56, 61, 303 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1981)(per curiam).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 145-162.
172. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573,
-, 260 S.E.2d 629, 639 (1979),cert. denied, 446
U.S. 929 (1980).
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of most of the cases interpreting the Act and provide an outline for
those faced with the task of applying the Act to a factual situation.
F.

THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE BASED UPON A VIOLATION OF
THE ACT

The common law rule is that illegally obtained evidence is not
excluded from evidence at trial. 17 3 Evidence obtained in violation of
a criminal defendant's constitutional rights constitutes an exception
to this rule. 17 4 Also, courts sometimes exclude evidence obtained in
75
violation of statutes or rules. 1
In United States v. Walden' 7 6 the Fourth Circuit Court of
177
Appeals considered whether the violation of a Navy regulation'
implementing the policy of the Posse Comitatus Act required the
exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of that violation. 78 In
Walden three marines worked as undercover investigators at the
request of a Special Investigator of the United States Treasury
Department. 79 In the course of their mission the marines
purchased firearms from the defendants who were selling them in
violation of federal firearms statutes.18 0 The defendants were
convicted of violating those statutes and appealed.' 8 '
On appeal the defendants contended that the Marine's
investigation violated the Navy regulation and the Posse Comitatus
Act of 1878 and that the trial court erred in failing to exlude the
fruits of that investigation.18 2 The court of appeals held that the
investigation violated the Navy regulation and the spirit of the Act,
but declined to apply an exclusionary rule. 8 3 In making this
determination, the court emphasized that violations of the Posse
Comitatus Act and its policy were not widespread. 8 4 The court
also stated that there was no evidence that the violation was
173. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183, at 7 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussion of
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence).
174. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S, 383, 398 (1914) (exclusionary rule for violations
of fourth amendment mandated in federal courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
(exclusionary rule for violations of fourth amendment mandated in state courts as well). See generally
C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PRODECURE § 2.01-04 (1980) (discussion of exclusionary evidence rule for
constitutional violations).
175. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1943) (violation of predecessor
of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required exclusion of evidence in federal
courts); State v. Anderson, 336 N.W.2d 634, 638-40 (N.D. 1983) (exclusion of evidence based on
policeman's violation of implied consent statute).
176. 490 F.2d 372 (4th.Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974).
177. See supra note 58.
178. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 376-77 (4th Cir.),cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974).
179. 490 F.2d at 373.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 372-73.
182. Id. at 373.
183. Id. at 373-77. Seesupra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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intentional and that the policy expressed in the Act was for the
benefit of the nation as a whole, and not designed to protect
individuals' personal rights. 185 Moreover, the court expressed
confidence that the military would take steps to prevent violations
of the Act, noting that a major reason for excluding evidence as a
result of fourth amendment violations is that alternative remedies
,have proved ineffective.18 6 The court concluded: "Should there be
evidence of widespread or repeated violations in any future case, or
ineffectiveness of enforcement by the military, we will consider
whether adoption of an exclusionary rule is required as a future

deterrent.

"187

Thus, the Walden court concluded that application of an
exclusionary rule is not presently necessary for violations of the
Posse Comitatus Act.188 The court warned, however, that it would
consider application of an exclusionary rule in the future if
89
violations of the Act become frequent and widespread. 1
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not wait for
frequent and widespread violations of the Act, but held that
application of an exclusionary rule was appropriate in Taylor v.
State. 190 In Taylor a military policeman requested the assistance of
the local police department in his investigation of an off-base source
of drugs. 19' The local police arrested the defendant after the
military policeman made an undercover drug purchase from
him. 192 During the arrest the military policeman pulled a gun, and
after the arrest he participated in the search of the defendant's
house. 93 The military policeman also delivered the drugs to the
civilian authorities and filled out the submittal forms. 194 The
184. 490 F.2d at 377. The court in Walden stated as follows:
[Ijmportant . . . is the fact that this case is the first instance to our knowledge in which
military personnel have been used as the principal investigators of civilian crimes in
violation of the [regulation]. We are not aware from the reported decisions of other

courts that there has been any other violation, let alone widespread or repeated
violations.
Id. (footnote omitted).

185. Id. at 376-77.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 377. AccordUnited States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979) (no exclusionary
rule applied, but left the matter open in case of widespread and repeated violations of the Act); State

v. Danko, 219 Kan. 490, 497-98, 548 P.2d 819, 825 (1976) (court followed Walden and declined to
apply an exclusionary rule).
188. 490 F.2d at 377.
189. Id.
190. 645 P.2d 522, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
191. Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522, 523 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 525.
194. Id.
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defendant was convicted of a drug offense and appealed. 195
On appeal the defendant contended that all the evidence
garnered pursuant to his arrest should have been excluded at trial
because the arrest was made in violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act. 196 The court stated that a violation of the Act does not
automatically require the application of an exclusionary rule, but
held that under the facts of the case the trial court erred in failing to
exclude the evidence. 197 The court noted that the military
policeman's involvement in the law enforcement activities was
excessive and "intolerably surpassed" that which was present in
three earlier Oklahoma cases in which no violation of the Act was
found. 198
Thus, according to Taylor, the application of an exclusionary
rule based upon a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act is not
automatic, but depends on the flagrancy of the violation. 199 Taylor
is a troublesome decision. In reaching its conclusion that the
evidence should have been excluded, the Taylor court did not
specifically state that the Act had been violated. This "oversight"
may exemplify a problem with the court's rationale in that it is
difficult enough to determine what constitutes a violation of the
Act,20 0 let alone a flagrant violation.
In summary, there are two rationales with respect to the
application of an exclusionary rule for violations of the Posse
Comitatus Act. Under the Walden rationale, application of an
exclusionary rule will not be considered until violations of the Act
become frequent and widespread. 2 0 1 Under the Taylor rationale, an
exclusionary rule will be applied only when the Act is flagrantly
2
violated . 02
195. Id. at 523.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 524-25.
198. Id. See Lee v. State, 513 P.2d 125, 126 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (no violation of Act
because military investigator did nothing more than act as a private citizen when he made an
undercover purchase without arresting defendant or asserting military authority over him), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974); Hildebrandt v. State, 507 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (no
violation of Act because military investigators made undercover purchase outside scope of military
jurisdiction where they assumed no greater authority than that of private citizens); Hubert v. State,
504 P.2d 1245, 1246-47 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (no violation of Act because military investigators
made undercover purchase outside scope of military jurisdiction where they assumed no greater
authority than that of private citizens). The conclusion of these cases that the military investigators
were acting as private citizens outside theirjurisdiction has been criticized as follows: "The decisions
fail to justify that conclusion and the facts simply do not support it. Rather than acting as private
citizens, the [military investigators] were engaging in their primary military occupation as criminal
investigators ....
Meeks, supra note 16, at 113.
199. See Taylor, 645 P.2d at 524.
200. See United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979). The court in Woffs
characterized the issue of what constitutes a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act as "complex and
difficult." Id.
201. See Walden, 490 F.2d at 377. See supra text accompanying notes 176-189.
202. See Taylor, 645 P.2d at 525. See supra text accompanying notes 190-199.
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Arguably, the exclusion of evidence is not a proper remedy for
a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Two reasons support this
argument. First, the Act does not provide for the exclusion of
evidence when the Act is violated. 20 3 Thus, there is no legal
requirement necessitating the exclusion of evidence when the Act is
violated. Second, the Act contains its own remedy - criminal
prosecution. 20 4 Although the possibility of a prosecution for a
violation of the Act appears slight, 20 5 it still exists. There is no
evidence that Congress intended the Posse Comitatus Act to double
as an exclusionary rule.
One may argue that the exclusion of evidence based upon a
violation of the Act is necessary to prevent the impairment of
judicial integrity that results when tainted evidence is admitted at
trial. 20 6 The counterargument to this proposition is that "there [is
no] evidence that the community disapproves more of convicting a
lawbreaker on tainted evidence than of letting the lawbreaker loose
to prey again." 2 0 7 More than fifty years ago, Judge, later Justice,
Cardozo observed that when an exclusionary rule is applied "[t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. ' 20 8 A
rewording of this observation shows its relevance to those situations
in which evidence is sought to be excluded because of a violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act: Is the criminal to go free because the
soldier has blundered?
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Posse Comitatus Act during the Civil
War reconstruction period to put an end to military involvement in
civilian law enforcement. 20 9 Although the Act sets forth a criminal
offense, criminal defendants have attempted to use it as an
2 10
exclusionary rule.
The cases interpreting the Posse Comitatus Act appear
discordant at first glance. Most of these cases can be reconciled,
however, to form criteria for determining when the Act is

203. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1385 (1982).
204. See id. (provides for payment offine up to $10,000, imprisonment up to two years, or both).
205. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
206. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.01 (1980) (discussion of rationales for
exclusionary evidence rule for constitutional violations).
207. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184(a), at 52 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
208. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (court rejected the federal
exclusionary rule for violations of the fourth amendment in pre-Mappera).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 11-42.
210. See, e.g., Walden, 490 F.2d at 373; Taylor, 645 P.2d at 523.
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viOlated. 2 11 These criteria are are follows: (1) the activity must be
willful; (2) the activity must involved the performance of duties
traditionally associated with law enforcement officers; (3) the
activity must be performed by military personnel who are not
and (4) the activity
acting on their own initiative as private citizens;
2 12
must not be justified by a military purpose.
There are two rationales with respect to the application of 2an
13
exclusionary rule for violations of the Posse Comitatus Act.
Under the Walden rationale application of an exclusionary rule will
not be considered until violations of the Act become frequent and
widespread.2 14 Under the Taylor rationale an exclusionary rule will
be applied only when

the Act is flagrantly violated. 2

5

The

exclusion of evidence does not appear to be a proper remedy for a
violation of the Act for two reasons. 2 16 First, the Act does not
provide for the exclusion of evidence. 2 17 8Second, the Act contains
2
its own remedy - criminal prosecution. 1
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211. See supra text accompanying notes 163-172.

212. Id.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 173-202.
214. See Walden, 490 F. 2d at 377. See supra text accompanying notes 176-189.
215. See Taylor, 645 P.2d at 524-25. See supra text accompanying notes 190-199.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 203-205.
217. See supra note 203.
218. See supra note 204.

